Representation in hard times: party-voter distance on support for Social Europe in Italy by F. Visconti & A. Pellegata
Italian Political Science, VOLUME 14 ISSUE 3, FEBRUARY 2020 
* This essay is part of the research project titled ‘Reconciling Economic and Social Europe: The Role of Val-
ues, Ideas and Politics’, funded by an Advanced Grant of the European Research Council (Grant No. 340534, 
P.I. Maurizio Ferrera). 
 
© 2020 Italian Political Science. ISSN 2420-8434. 
Volume 14, Issue 3, x–x [forthcoming]. 
Contact Author: Francesco Visconti, University of Milan. 
E-mail address: francesco.visconti@unimi.it 
Representation in hard times: 
party-voter distance on support for 
Social Europe in Italy* 
Francesco Visconti 
UNIVERSITY OF MILAN 
Alessandro Pellegata 
UNIVERSITY OF MILAN 
Abstract 
Political representation is a fundamental virtue of contemporary democracies. The policy preferences of politi-
cians should converge to some extent with those of voters. In the last twenty years, and in particular in the 
aftermath of the multiple crises the European Union (EU) has recently experienced, the integration process has 
become an increasingly polarizing issue for both voters and political representatives. While the existing literature 
has investigated party-voter distance on diffuse support for the EU, this article focuses on preferences for EU-
level policies aiming to strengthen European solidarity. We argue that although Italian voters and their political 
representatives tend to diverge on their general support for the EU, they are closer over their willingness to share 
the burden across EU member states of the multiple crises Italy has recently experienced. Employing original 
mass and elite survey data collected between the end of 2016 and the beginning of 2018 in the framework of 
the REScEU project, our empirical findings show that both MPs and their voters strongly support European 
solidarity, though they also detect differences across parties. The most important implication of this study is that 
the mounting Euroscepticism of Italian voters is not an outright rejection of the EU but a call for the EU’s proac-
tive role in protecting weaker countries and peoples. 
1. Introduction 
n representative democracies the decisions made by policy-makers should, to some 
degree, mirror the preferences of their voters (Downs 1957). The present article looks 
at collective representation (Wlezien and Soroka 2016) by comparing the (general 
and specific) attitudes towards the European Union (EU) of Italian citizens with those of 
their parliamentary representatives. While most of the extant literature analyses the gap 
between masses and elites in their diffuse support for the EU (Dolny and Babos 2015; Mat-
tila and Raunio 2006; 2012; McEvoy 2012; Thomassen and Schmitt 1999), our study takes 
a less travelled road by focusing also on the differences in how the demand side and the 
supply side of the chain of representation evaluate the policy-making role played by EU 
institutions (see Sanders and Toka 2013 or Muller et al. 2012). More precisely, we investi-
gate party-voter issue proximity on preferences for policies aiming to foster European 
I 
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solidarity, an issue that in the aftermath of the Euro crisis has become highly salient and 
contentious in several EU member states. 
In the last two decades, a broad literature has discussed how EU integration and 
other macro-level phenomena such as globalisation and massive migration have contrib-
uted to reshaping party competition in several European countries by generating a new 
political divide that deals with the opening of national borders and cross cuts the tradi-
tional left-right dimension (Kriesi 2008; 2012; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Otjes and 
Katsanidou 2017). Considering its increasing policy-making role during the Euro and the 
refugee crises, the EU has further polarised the attitudes of both voters and political elites. 
What is increasingly debated are the policy initiatives and measures that the EU has 
adopted (or should adopt) to face the negative externalities of the multiple crises it has 
experienced and to avoid future predicaments: in other words, policies fostering solidar-
ity across EU member states as well as European citizens. Financial help to states facing 
severe economic difficulties, the harmonisation of welfare policies to guarantee a high 
standard of social security to all Europeans in need, and the redistribution of extra-EU 
migrants and asylum seekers among EU member states are all items on the agenda of po-
litical parties that campaign on these issues to gain electoral consensus. However, while 
several recent studies investigate the determinants of public support for European soli-
darity (Baute et al. 2019; Ciornei and Recchi 2017; Ferrera and Pellegata 2018; Gerhards 
et al. 2019), we have significantly less knowledge about the attitudes expressed by political 
elites (see Conti 2018 for an exception). To the best of our knowledge, moreover, no study 
expressly compares voter and party preferences on this highly contentious topic. 
Italy represents an interesting case to study party-voter distance on the topic of Eu-
ropean solidarity. It was badly hit by the economic recession, it implemented a series of 
fiscal austerity measures and structural reforms to keep its public debt under control, and 
it is one of the first landing places for migrants coming from the African continent. On 
the political side, Italy has shown a dramatic decrease in popular support for the EU and 
trust in its institutions and, at the same time, a significant increase in electoral consent 
for Eurosceptic parties, though with different nuances, such as the Five Star Movement 
(M5S), the League (L) and Brothers of Italy (FdI). 
Thus, do voter and party preferences tend to converge or diverge on the issues of Eu-
ropean integration and solidarity? Are there differences across parties in how close 
political representatives are to their voters? We expect to find a significant divergence be-
tween Italian voters and elites on a general evaluation of the benefits of the EU project 
with the former being more sceptical than the latter. However, we expect to find more 
convergence on support for policies strengthening solidarity in the EU. Given Italy’s ex-
posure to the crises, both voters and their representatives demand EU-policy 
intervention to correct economic and social imbalances among EU member states that 
the recent challenges experienced by the EU have exacerbated.  
We provide answers to these research questions by employing original public opin-
ion and political elite survey data collected between the end of 2016 and the beginning of 
2018 within the framework of the REScEU (Reconciling Economic and Social Europe: 
Values, Ideas and Politics) research project conducted at the University of Milan in the 
2014-2019 period. While exploratory in nature due to the limitations of the data, we be-
lieve that the present study provides useful contributions to the literature on both EU 
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support and representation in Italy. Regarding the former, by comparing party-voter dis-
tance not only on the general view of the EU but also on its policy role, we shed light on the 
nature of Euroscepticism in Italy. Concerning the latter, we provide important insights 
on how the integration-demarcation dimension is contributing to restructure the prefer-
ences of political actors in the Italian party system. 
2. Background and expectations 
2.1. Italy and the crises 
The multiple crises that the EU has experienced in the last decade have contributed to 
exacerbate the line of tension over the integration process and to generate a new conflict 
constellation within the EU (Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Ferrera 2017). The bailout of the 
Greek economy in exchange for severe austerity measures, Merkel’s decision to allow 
more than one million asylum seekers into Germany and the outcome of the Brexit refer-
endum as well as other critical junctures became salient political issues for national 
governments and affected the everyday life of European citizens. 
However, the consequences of the multifaceted European crisis were unevenly dis-
tributed across EU member states. Italy, as well as other weak economies of the Eurozone 
periphery, was strongly affected by the detrimental consequences of the global economic 
downturn and the sovereign debt crisis. Since 2009, the main macro-economic indicators 
have abruptly deteriorated. The sharp decline in GDP caused the Italian economy to enter 
recession and in 2012 – the peak of the sovereign debt crisis – Italian public debt rose to 
126.16 per cent of GDP – a figure considerably higher not only than the average value of 
the Eurozone, but also than the average value of southern European member states 
(Pedrazzani et al. 2018). Even though Italy, differently from Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain, did not formally sign a bailout agreement with the ‘Troika’ (EU Commission, Eu-
ropean Central Bank and International Monetary Fund), the country committed itself to 
an ‘implicit conditionality’ programme that implied fiscal austerity measures and struc-
tural (labour market and pensions) reforms (Moschella 2017; Sacchi 2015).  
The economic downturn and the policies implemented by the technocratic Monti 
government (2011-2013) had relevant negative social consequences (Natili 2019). Unem-
ployment rose from 6.1 per cent of the labour force in 2007 to 13.1 per cent in 2014 and the 
scenario was even more alarming concerning youth unemployment, which rose from 
20.4 per cent in 2007 to a remarkable 42.7 per cent in 2014. Poverty rose as well: the share 
of households living in absolute poverty increased from 4.7 per cent in 2009 to 7.9 per cent 
in 2013 (ISTAT 2019a). The deterioration of the objective indicators was paralleled by 
mounting public concern about the situation of the national economy, with a peak of neg-
ative evaluations – over 92 per cent of Italian citizens – in 20121. 
Besides the economic crisis, Italy is facing other important challenges deriving from 
increasing migration flows into the country. Given its geographic position, in the after-
math of the Arab Spring, Italy became one of the countries of first landing for migrants 
and asylum seekers coming from the African continent. Immigration contributed to 
 
1 See Eurobarometer data on Italian citizens’ evaluation of their national economy: http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index . 
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change the composition of Italian society. While in the early 2000s foreign-born residents 
were around 1.5 million, at the beginning of 2018 they were around 5 million, about 8.5% 
of the total population (ISTAT 2019b). This mutated social landscape contributed to affect 
the Italians’ attitude towards immigration. A series of IPSOS surveys highlight that Ital-
ian citizens tend to overestimate the real number of immigrants living in their country.2 
In the weeks before the 2018 national elections, 62 per cent of respondents who partici-
pated in the PASTEL survey believed that Italy had already hosted too many immigrants 
and 43 per cent of them believed that foreigners represent a threat to Italian culture.3 
The consequences of these multiple challenges on party system configuration and 
electoral competition dynamics are manifest for the observers of Italian politics. Indeed, 
the 2013 and 2018 general elections caused a political earthquake (Chiaramonte et al. 
2018; Emanuele 2018; Schadee et al.2019). In line with a pattern emerging also in other 
EU member states badly hit by the economic crisis (Hutter et al. 2018), the last two elec-
tion rounds marked a significant increase in votes for Eurosceptic parties at the expense 
of the mainstream parties – the Democratic Party (PD) and Go Italy (FI) – that had rotated 
in government since the mid-1990s. In 2013 M5S – a populist and anti-elite party – ob-
tained 25.6 per cent of the vote, which is the best result ever obtained by a newcomer party 
in national elections in Europe. After five years in opposition, in 2018 M5S managed to 
again increase their vote share (32.7 per cent) becoming the pivot in the parliament and 
the major party in the two different government coalitions it has experienced so far. The 
2018 elections also marked a victory for the League – a right-wing Eurosceptic party ren-
ovated under Matteo Salvini’s leadership – which quadrupled its vote share (17.4%) 
compared with the 2013 elections (4.1%). 
2.2. Diffuse and Policy support for the EU during the crisis 
Against this background, a number of recent studies depict how the average level of public 
support for the EU among Italian citizens – traditionally among the highest across EU 
member states from the 70s to the 90s – sharply decreased after the crises that invested Eu-
rope in the last decade (Olmastroni and Pellegata 2018; Conti et al. 2020; Serricchio 2018). 
The deterioration in the level of support for the EU is striking whichever dimension we con-
sider: polity identification, trust in EU institutions, benefit from EU membership or the 
deepening of the integration process (Olmastroni and Pellegata 2018; Conti et al. 2020). A 
similar trend is detected in all southern EU member states, while in northern and continen-
tal countries the average support for the EU remained high also during the crisis (2011-
2016). The literature argues that economic concerns and perceived threats to national iden-
tity are the main drivers of Euroscepticism (Bellucci 2014; Conti and Memoli 2015). In hard 
times, individuals blame the EU because they consider it responsible for the worsening of 
both their personal and their country’s economic conditions. 
While a broad literature has investigated trends of public support for the EU, we 
know incredibly less about political elites’ preferences on this increasingly contentious 
issue. Figure 1 compares the attitudes of Italian voters and their representatives in the 
Chamber of Deputies towards the EU. Data on voters are taken from the Eurobarometer 
 
2 See the IPSOS ‘perils of perceptions’ project (https://perils.ipsos.com/). 
3 Participated platform for the study of Italian Elections 2018, a project of the Department of Social and 
Political Sciences of the University of Milan and Ipsos Italia. REScEU project sample.  
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88.1 (October 2017) while data on national representatives come from the REScEU elite 
survey conducted between 2017 and 20184. The column chart displays the share of voters 
and political representatives who believe that Italy has benefited or has not benefited 
from EU membership. We chose this question to compare mass and elite support for the 
EU for two main reasons. First, this is one of the most commonly used survey items in the 
literature on EU support. By tapping the utilitarian calculation with which individuals 
evaluate their country’s membership in the EU, this is particularly suitable for measuring 
how Italians’ judgement of the EU has changed during the crisis. Second, this is one of the 
few survey items for which data are available at both mass and political elite level. 
Figure 1. Diffuse support for the EU among Italian masses and elites. 
 
Note: ‘Taking everything into consideration, would you say that [COUNTRY] has on balance benefited or not from being a member 
of the European Union? 1) It has benefited; 2) It has not benefited.’ 
Not surprisingly, in late 2017, 46.2 per cent of Italian respondents believed that their 
country had not benefited from being a member of the EU. This percentage is one of the 
highest among the 28 EU member states and it reflects a pattern common to other south-
ern EU member states, such as Cyprus (49.7 per cent) and Greece (45.9 per cent). 
However, citizens of other countries that have been badly hit by the Euro crisis such as 
Portugal (14.2 per cent) and Spain (20.4 per cent) tend to evaluate much more positively 
their country’s membership in the EU. On average, instead, Italian political representa-
tives are much more satisfied than their electorate with Italy’s membership in the EU. 
73.7 per cent of the MPs interviewed believe that Italy has benefited from being a mem-
ber of the EU, while only 26.3 per cent express a negative view about the EU. 
Although the support for the EU expressed by Italian political elites has also wors-
ened in the last decade, even after the crisis an overwhelming majority of MPs tend to 
express a positive evaluation of Italy’s membership in the EU.5 More than 30 points sep-
arate Italian MPs from their voters, with the former being more supportive of the EU 
 
4 Detailed information about the survey is reported in the next section. 
5 Data taken from the IntUne elite survey show that the share of MPs who believe that Italy has not bene-
fited from being a member of the EU was 4.1 per cent in 2007 and 2.6 per cent in 2009 (Best et al. 2012). 
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than the latter. This result confirms that the EU can still be considered an elite-driven 
project (Haller 2008). The masses’ permissive consensus that allowed a deepening and 
a widening of the integration process for more than three decades after the Treaty of 
Maastricht (1992) turned into an explicit dissensus that started to constrain the work of 
the EU institutions (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Müller et al. 2012; Sanders et al. 2012; 
Conti 2014). Opposition to the integration process became explicit especially in those 
countries badly hit by the multiple crises experienced by the EU. In these countries citi-
zens voiced criticism of the role played by the EU institutions during the crisis and 
Eurosceptic parties entered the government. 
However, if we turn to analyse support for specific policies that can be implemented 
by the EU institutions to challenge the most contentious and detrimental aspects of the 
different European crises, we expect to find closer views between Italian citizens and 
their representatives in parliament. We start from the assumption that, since Italy found 
itself in the eye of the storm of simultaneous crises, the relevance of the utilitarian cal-
culation over the role of the EU increases both for public opinion and among political 
elites. Given that the EU is a supranational project built with the aim of providing solu-
tions to large-scale problems, such as the economic recession and the humanitarian 
crisis related to massive migration flows, in a socio-tropic perspective Italian masses and 
elites should be more supportive of EU-level policies aiming to strengthen solidarity 
across EU member states by sharing among them the burden of the crises. In an appar-
ently paradoxical scenario, while Italian citizens are more negative than their official 
representatives when expressing a general judgment of the EU as a polity project, they 
share preferences closer to those of the elite for policies that can help Italy, as well as the 
other countries in difficulties, to face the detrimental consequences of the crises. 
Recent studies have investigated which factors contribute to explain mass and elite 
support for burden sharing and solidarity measures across EU member states and for 
delegating policy initiative to the EU (Basile and Olmastroni 2019; Conti et al. 2020). The 
degree of exposure to the crisis at both the country and individual levels correlate signif-
icantly with support for European solidarity. The present study, instead of assessing 
mass and elite correlates of support for a more proactive role of the EU, remains inter-
ested in the existence of representation gaps between voters and parties over EU-level 
policies strengthening European solidarity. 
In doing so we mainly focus on differences across parties. We are firstly interested in 
comparing the level of party-voter distance between mainstream and challenger parties. 
Following the definition provided by Hobolt and Tilley (2016), challenger parties are not 
necessarily new but are those parties that have ‘sought to reshape the political landscape 
by putting new issues on the agenda’ (Hobolt and Tilley 2016, 974). In the following anal-
yses we consider the M5S and the L as two challenger parties given the issue-
entrepreneurship role they played in the recent developments in Italian politics. They 
have been able to mobilise the electorate on new issues like European integration and im-
migration, by breaking the previous consensus.6 Challenger parties should also not have 
 
6 The 2017 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017) considers the L and the M5S as the two parties 
among those investigated with the lowest values in overall orientation towards European integration 
(variable goes from 1 ‘Strongly opposes’ to 7 ‘Strongly in favour’). Party scores are: L 1.5; FI 4.714; M5S 
2.643; PD 6.5; SI 4.5; MDP 5.363. 
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had previous government experience. While this was true for the M5S at the time the two 
surveys were conducted, this is not the case for the L who held important government po-
sitions in all governments led by Silvio Berlusconi. Still, the new leadership of Matteo 
Salvini has given a new and distinct characterisation to the party, and thus we consider it 
a challenger.7 Due to their role as issue entrepreneurs, we expect challenger parties to re-
duce the gap with their voters, as well as with the median Italian voter, compared to 
mainstream parties (PD and FI) that have registered major electoral setbacks. 
3. Defining and measuring European solidarity 
The concept of solidarity refers to individuals’ agreement to share resources with others 
by personal contribution through taxation and redistribution organised by the state (Ge-
lissen, 2000; Stjernø, 2009). It is a definition grounded in the very notion of nation state, 
and historically solidarity has been institutionalised through the development of national 
welfare states. 
Since the 1980s, the successive waves of European integration have put under stress 
nation-based welfare systems. This was primarily due to the tension between the ‘logic of 
closure’ upon which nation-based welfare states developed and the ‘logic of openness’ of 
EU integration, represented by the completion of the internal market and then by the in-
stitutionalisation of the monetary union. This tension threatening the social sovereignty 
of EU member states has forced institutions and citizens to reframe the concept of soli-
darity in European terms (Ferrera 2017). 
In the EU wide context, solidarity has been (re-)defined as the individual willingness 
to share risks across the EU (Ciornei and Recchi 2017:470). Sangiovanni (2013) differen-
tiates between two dimensions of European solidarity: member state and transnational 
solidarity. The former refers to risk sharing across EU member states. The latter entails 
the sharing of obligations among EU citizens (see also Ciornei and Recchi 2017; Baute et 
al. 2019). Here we consider both these dimensions of European solidarity. 
The following analyses draw on two surveys conducted within the REScEU project. 
The first is a public opinion survey carried out in the autumn of 2016 that evaluates citi-
zens’ preferences on EU solidarity. It includes 1,320 Italian respondents interviewed 
through the CAWI method and sampled around age, education, and area of residence. 
The second is an elite survey conducted on national members of parliament (MPs) be-
tween 2017 and 2018. It includes 87 Italian MPs of the lower chamber (Camera dei 
Deputati) elected in 2013, of whom 76 answered all relevant EU solidarity items. 
In both surveys we identified five items designed to measure Italian citizens’ and 
MPs’ support for policy programmes introducing cross-national and trans-national 
forms of European solidarity. Table A1 in the Appendix lists these five items along with 
their response categories. The first question asks respondents whether they are in favour 
of or against the introduction of common European bonds. While undoubtedly a technical 
issue, so-called Eurobonds became a salient topic after the Euro crisis in the Italian de-
bate. Think for instance about the M5S manifesto prepared for the 2014 European 
Parliament elections that explicitly mentioned the introduction of Eurobonds as one of 
 
7 Brothers of Italy can also be considered a challenger party, but due to the low number of MPs of this party 
that took part in the elite survey we could not consider them in our analyses. 
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their seven key proposals (Della Porta et al.2017). The second question asks respondents 
to indicate whether they are in favour of or against the introduction of a common EU fund 
compensating national governments and local communities for the costs related to im-
migration from other EU member states. In the last five years in Italy as well as in other 
countries both intra and extra EU immigration have become a more salient topic of polit-
ical debate on which right-wing populist parties have capitalised. The third EU solidarity 
item measures respondents’ preferences on the institution of common EU social insur-
ance schemes (such as healthcare, unemployment or pensions) covering intra-EU 
migrant workers. This question captures preferences over forms of trans-national soli-
darity, and preferences over one of the cardinal achievements of the EU: free movement. 
The fourth question asks citizens and MPs whether or not they agree with the introduc-
tion of an EU budget large enough to provide substantial financial help to member states 
facing a sudden rise in unemployment rates, which remains among the top concerns in 
the minds of Italian citizens. The fifth and final question asks citizens and MPs whether 
they agree that in the case of a severe financial crisis in a given member state, the EU 
should make sure that no citizen remains without means of subsistence (food, shelter, es-
sential medicines etc.). This item depicts a social crisis triggered by severe economic 
turmoil, a scenario similar to what happened in Greece during the Euro crisis. 
Responses were given using 4-point Likert scales (1 - Strongly disagree/against, 2 - 
Somewhat disagree/against, 3 - Somewhat agree/in favour, 4 - Strongly agree/in fa-
vour), where lower values mean anti-solidarity preferences, and higher values pro-
solidarity views.8 
In the next section we gauge the congruence between Italian voters and party repre-
sentatives both on the single dimensions, as well as on a comprehensive measure of EU 
solidarity. This consists of an additive index based on the summation of respondents’ an-
swers on the five solidarity items presented above. The index has then been rescaled to 
vary between ‘0 - Anti-EU solidarity’ and ’10 - Pro-EU solidarity’. The internal con-
sistency of this index is ensured by a factor analysis run on polychoric correlations 
separately for the elites and the mass datasets, confirming that these items are captured 
by only one underlying dimension.9 
To investigate the congruence between Italian MPs and their electorate, we have 
matched them based on the party group of the MP at the moment of the interview, and 
on the future vote intention of citizens. To ensure consistency we included in our anal-
yses only parties for whom more than three MPs and at least ten voters have been 
interviewed. Table A2 in the Appendix lists the political parties with the number of vot-
ers and MPs considered in the analysis: Sinistra Italiana + Movimento Democratico e 
Progressista (SI+MDP), Partito Democratico (PD), Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S), Forza Ita-
lia (FI), and Lega (L). 
 
8 Employing short answers scales to survey questions protects against the risk of excessive influence of 
outliers. This is a way to make findings relatively more robust given the difficulties of collecting elite data 
and the relatively small number of observations that does not allow us to conduct more sophisticate tests. 
9 Table A3 in the Appendix displays results obtained from factor analysis. The correlation between the 
additive index of EU solidarity and the factor extracted from the factor analysis is of 0.995 for MPs and 
0.993 for citizens. 
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4. Assessing party-voter differences 
Here we are interested in comparing Italian public opinion and political elites on the Eu-
ropean solidarity issue. To this end we look at two dyads: issue congruence between 
citizens and MPs, and between voters and parties. Firstly, we compare the average levels 
of support for European solidarity expressed by our samples of Italian citizens and politi-
cal representatives, irrespective of their different political orientations and partisan 
affiliations. With this analysis we aim to detect whether political elites are also more sup-
portive of policies fostering European solidarity than citizens, as they are for the EU in 
general. Then we turn to compare the distance in support for European solidarity between 
major Italian parties and their voters to assess whether there are differences between 
mainstream and challenger parties. Rather than focusing on the individual representa-
tive, we scrutinise party-level representation because the electoral system in place at the 
time of the elite survey emphasised the central role of parties in the chain of representa-
tion. The ‘Calderoli electoral law’ was indeed a proportional representation system with 
a majority prize for the plurality party/coalition, large districts and blocked lists in which 
the voter could not express any preference vote. While directly comparing distributions 
within two groups is a viable approach (Golder and Stramski 2010; Lupu et al. 2017) we 
follow the classic representation literature that resorts to measures of central tendency 
like the mean and the median (Huber and Powell 1994; Müller et al. 2012) to evaluate ab-
solute congruence. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the additive EU solidarity index and each of its 
five components for the Italian masses and elites in the aggregate. They show that on aver-
age, both the Italian public and elites favour a very high level of EU solidarity. On average, 
Italian citizens share an EU solidarity score of 7.35 on a scale from 0 to 10. At the same time, 
MPs are even closer to the pro-EU solidarity pole, with an average value of 8.33. 
Looking at each solidarity item separately, we note that the interpolated median10 
is always closer to the pro-solidarity pole of the measurement scale for both groups with 
only slight mass-elite differences. Italian political elites are a bit more pro-EU solidarity 
than the average Italian citizen on all policies but one – preferences for an EU budget 
large enough to provide financial help to MSs in case of a sudden rise in unemployment. 
In this case, no relevant difference between the two groups emerges. The introduction 
of Eurobonds is the solidarity policy towards which both the public and elites are rela-
tively more sceptical. Instead, the one receiving the broadest support is the policy 
programme ensuring the EU will guarantee to all its citizens that no one is left behind 
in the aftermath of an economic crisis. The two European solidarity policies relating to 
the free movement of European citizens, the fund compensating for the costs of man-
aging intra-EU migration and the institutionalisation of a supra-national social 
insurance, are instead the two proposals with the relatively most significant discrep-
ancy between masses and elites. 
At the aggregate level, we find support for our expectation of observing closer views 
between Italian citizens and their representatives when it comes to specific EU level pol-
icy programmes fostering solidarity, rather than when looking at diffuse support. 
 
10 When dealing with ordinal variables with a limited number of responses, comparing simple medians 
may not be informative: two distributions with equal median may be heavily weighted above or below the 
median. The interpolated median provides an alternative measure of centre which takes into account the 
percentage of the data strictly below or strictly above the median. It gives a measure within the upper and 
lower bound of the median, in the direction that the data is more heavily weighted. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for EU solidarity index and its five components. 
EU solidarity index Mean Standard 
Error 
Median St. Dev. N 
Elite 8.33 0.154 8.67 1.34 76 
Mass 7.35 0.043 7.33 1.56 1295 
Introduction of Eurobonds Mean Standard 
Error 
Interpolated 
median 
St. Dev. N 
Elite 3.37 0.086 3.36 0.75 76 
Mass 2.86 0.02 2.94 0.85 1295 
EU fund to compensate for 
immigration costs 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Interpolated 
median 
St. Dev. N 
Elite 3.55 0.076 3.70 0.66 76 
Mass 3.19 0.022 3.25 0.80 1295 
EU social insurance covering 
intra-EU migrants 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Interpolated 
median 
St. Dev. N 
Elite 3.47 0.081 3.58 0.70 76 
Mass 3.01 0.022 3.07 0.80 1295 
EU should provide financial 
help to MSs in case of sud-
den rise in unemployment 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Interpolated 
median 
St. Dev. N 
Elite 3.34 0.078 3.44 0.69 76 
Mass 3.39 0.018 3.46 0.66 1295 
EU should ensure subsist-
ence in case of financial 
crisis 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Interpolated 
median 
St. Dev. N 
Elite 3.76 0.049 3.85 0.42 76 
Mass 3.57 0.017 3.70 0.63 1295 
 
Of course, aggregate level differences can hinder variation at a lower level of analysis. 
The next figures present data disaggregated by party, portraying the median position of 
parties (blue dots), of their voters (red triangles), and the median position of all Italian 
citizens interviewed in the mass survey (dotted line) on all measures of EU solidarity. Fig-
ure 2 portrays the median on the EU solidarity index for the five parties meeting the 
conditions described in the previous section and listed from left to right on the vertical 
axis: SI+MDP, PD, M5S, FI, L.11 The horizontal axis records instead the median on the EU 
solidarity additive index for both party members and for citizens who would vote for these 
parties. Four insights emerge from the figure. First, there is more between-party variation 
in support of European solidarity among political elites than among voters. While median 
supporters of parties tend to be closer to the median citizen, the median representatives 
of the same parties, though they tend to be more pro-solidarity than the median citizen, 
present more differences. Second, while in the aggregate the elites were more pro-
 
11 The left-right positioning of Italian parties is based on the 2017 Chapel Hill Expert FLASH Survey (Polk 
et al. 2017) available at https://www.chesdata.eu/1999-2014-chapel-hill-expert-survey-ches-trend-file-
1.The position of the parties on the LRGEN variable measuring  parties’ ideology – where 0 means ‘Ex-
treme left’ and 10 ‘Extreme right’ – is the following: SI 1.36; MDP 2.23; PD 3.8; M5S 5.2; FI 6.533; L 8.26. 
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European solidarity than the masses, this is not always true when we look at each party 
separately. The aggregate level result holds for SI+MDP, PD, and L. The two parties lo-
cated closer to the left pole of the ideological axis are those with the largest distance 
between elites and masses (for both parties, voters and MPs shared the same median po-
sition). Solidarity policies are the preferred terrain of battle for left-wing parties, issues 
that therefore they tend to emphasise more in their political activities. The same also 
holds for the League of Matteo Salvini. Interestingly, L voters are the only group whose 
median lies below the overall median of Italian citizens. Third, MPs of the L, together with 
the M5S representatives, are the least supportive of European solidarity. Nevertheless, 
compared to the left-wing MPs, they are closer both to the L median voter and to the me-
dian citizen. Finally, FI and M5S show perfect congruence between national MPs and 
their voters. Voters of Berlusconi’s party present the same median score on the solidarity 
index as the left-wing voters (PD and SI+MDP). However, FI MPs are less prone to sup-
porting pro-solidarity policies than their left-wing counterparts. The perfect congruence 
of the position of M5S representatives not only with their electoral base but also with the 
median Italian citizen on the issue of EU solidarity is probably related to their electoral 
success in the general elections of 8 March. It falls in line with the pivotal role played by 
the M5S in the Italian political system since the 2013 elections 
Figure 2. Medians for voters and elites on the EU solidarity index. 
 
Looking at the additive index may hinder differences on the specific policy pro-
posals considered. While the underlying structure of preferences on the five issues is 
similar, it is not exactly the same and there is some independent variation across the 
five EU solidarity policies. Therefore, Figures 3 and 4 show the interpolated medians on 
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solidarity, while the second looks at the transnational forms of EU solidarity. First, we 
find that there is greater congruence on issues related to poverty and unemployment, 
two problems that the economic crisis has exacerbated since 2009. Both parties’ and 
voters’ preferences on these issues are very close to the pro-EU-solidarity extreme. 
Therefore, regardless of the polity-level Euroscepticism characterising Italian citizens, 
it emerges that a solution to these problems lies at the supra-national level through fur-
ther integration in the minds not only of MPs but also of voters. Second, we find lower 
congruence when we look at support for the introduction of Eurobonds to pool risks re-
lated to public debt. This is a complex issue to be understood and processed by citizens, 
and across parties they tend to align close to the overall country median. Third, the two 
policies related to freedom of movement are the ones with more variation across parties 
in terms of congruence. 
Figure 3. Interpolated medians for voters and elites on cross-national components of EU solidarity. 
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Concerning the first policy, the introduction of an EU fund compensating member 
states for immigration costs, we find a low level of congruence for all parties but SI+MDP, 
which perfectly match their voters, and the M5S. As regards this policy, of particular in-
terest is the distance between the interpolated median of MPs of the L and their voters, 
which is the most extreme distance between elites and voters found in our data. L’s voters 
are only moderately in favour of more integration policies in the field of immigration, and 
less so than the median citizen. Instead, their representatives hold a very favourable opin-
ion about the introduction of this programme. This result could hint at the outright 
rejection of immigration on behalf of voters, notwithstanding refunds for its manage-
ment. On the second policy item related to free movement, the introduction of a social 
insurance scheme covering workers moving from one EU member state to another, our 
data suggest an association between the interpolated median position of MPs and the left-
right positioning of their party: the more a party locates itself on the left, the more it sup-
ports such a form of transnational solidarity. Still, parties located on the left of the 
ideological spectrum are those less congruent with their voters. Even if M5S representa-
tives are less in favour of EU solidarity policies than left-wing parties (apart from the item 
on subsistence in case of a severe crisis), they tend to be very much attuned to their voters 
and the general citizenry. 
Figure 4. Interpolated medians for voters and elites on transnational components of EU solidarity 
  
 
These results suggest the M5S has been able to catalyse the priorities and preferences 
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5. Concluding remarks 
This article investigated party-voter distance on support for policies strengthening the so-
cial dimension of Europe in Italy. In the aftermath of the multiple crises that the EU has 
experienced in the last decade, solidarity and redistribution of resources across EU member 
states and citizens have become salient and highly contentious issues among both political 
elites and citizens. While Italian voters are much more sceptical than their representatives 
about the benefit brought by their country’s membership in the EU, they are much closer to 
them when it comes to supporting policies strengthening European solidarity. In a country 
such as Italy, badly hit by the Euro crisis and by the negative externalities of fiscal austerity, 
both public opinion and political elites blame EU institutions for being unable to face the 
unevenly distributed challenges coming from the crisis and ask for policies aiming to redis-
tribute resources and correct imbalances across EU member states. By means of a public 
opinion and elite survey under the framework of the REScEU project, we analysed the Ital-
ian mass-elite gap on support for policies fostering European solidarity, focusing on 
differences across parties. We found a high level of congruence between mass and elite pref-
erences towards pro-solidarity policies. Left-wing parties (PD and SI+MDP) are the most 
supportive of European solidarity. For these parties as well as for the League we detected a 
certain amount of divergence between MPs and their voters, with the former tending to be 
more pro-EU solidarity than the latter. Our analysis revealed instead a perfect match-up of 
the M5S MPs’ preferences and those of both their voters and the Italian median citizen. Vot-
ers of the League show they are the most Eurosceptic, while M5S party representatives show 
on overage a lower level of support for pro-EU solidarity policies, even when they were part 
of their official electoral manifesto as in the case of Eurobonds. These findings seem to cor-
roborate works on the issue-entrepreneurial role of challenger parties and their ability to 
better represent the median citizen (Hobolt and Tilley 2016). 
While exploratory in nature, our study suggests two relevant and interrelated implica-
tions. First, our findings show that, though salient, EU-related issues do not seem to 
contribute to reshaping political competition in Italy. Although we detected few cross-par-
tisan differences, voters and MPs have preferences in favour of policies that can contribute 
to sharing the burden of the multiple crises Italy is experiencing with other EU member 
states by redistributing risks, resources and responsibilities. Second, this study sheds light 
on the nature of the Euroscepticism that is increasingly characterizing large sectors of Ital-
ian public opinion as well as important parties. It is plausible that Italians are sceptical about 
the EU institutions for being unable, or unwilling, to implement policies that can help those 
member states that, more than others, are facing the challenges provided by the multiple 
crises that recently invested Europe. However, both Italian voters and their political repre-
sentatives do not consider the EU a project deemed to fail but, on the contrary, they ask for 
a proactive role of the EU in protecting weaker countries and peoples. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable's components. 
Question wording Response categories 
Thinking about the European Union over the next 10 years, can you 
indicate whether you are in favour or against the following: 
 
Item 1 The introduction of common European bonds (aka Eu-robonds). 
1- Strongly against; 
2- Somewhat against; 
3- Somewhat in favour; 
4- Strongly in favour 
Item 2 
The introduction of a common EU fund compensating 
national governments and local communities for the 
costs related to immigration from other EU member 
states. 
Item 3 
The introduction of common EU social insurance 
schemes (such as healthcare, unemployment or pen-
sions) that cover intra-EU migrant workers. 
EU member states have decided that their economic and social poli-
cies should be brought closer together. Please indicate whether you 
agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 
Item 4 
The EU should equip itself with a budget large enough 
to provide substantial financial help to member states 
facing a sudden rise in unemployment rates. 1- Strongly disagree; 
2- Somewhat disagree; 
3- Somewhat agree; 
4- Strongly agree Item 5 
In the case of a very severe financial crisis in a given 
member state, the EU should make sure that no citizen 
of that state remains without means of subsistence 
(food, shelter, essential medicines etc...). 
 
Table A2. Number of MPs and voters for each party considered. 
Party Number of MPs Number of voters 
SI+MDP 9 21 
PD 39 235 
M5S 13 305 
FI 7 51 
LEGA 4 99 
Total 72 711 
 
Table A3. Results from factor analyses on elites and masses items. 
 Elites  Masses  
Variables Factor loadings Uniqueness Factor loadings Uniqueness 
Eurobonds 0.580 0.586 0.371 0.810 
Financial help 0.334 0.612 0.575 0.504 
Subsistence 0.411 0.597 0.583 0.489 
Immigration 0.738 0.442 0.679 0.473 
Insurance 0.756 0.400 0.605 0.506 
Eigenvalues 1.733  1.636  
Note: factor analyses based on polychoric correlations. 
